# The Missing Rulebook: Why CLARITY Stalled in the Senate

> Passed in July 2025, CLARITY sat at Senate Calendar No. 423 past July 2026 over ethics, Section 604, and stablecoin yield.

- Source: https://www.steadyrain.xyz/en/articles/clarity-act-stall-market-structure-law/
- Publisher: Steady Rain
- Author: 0xYatha
- Published: 2026-11-20T06:04:24.348Z
- Categories: DeFi
- Language: en

## Introduction

The CLARITY Act passed the House on July 17, 2025 and, as of July 2026, was still sitting at Senate Calendar No. 423 with no floor vote held and no cloture motion filed. Republicans hold 53 seats, which means the bill needs seven to nine Democratic votes to clear a 60-vote threshold; at that point only Senators Ruben Gallego and Angela Alsobrooks had supported it, both with conditions attached. The arithmetic has not moved despite the Senate Banking Committee advancing compromise text 15-9 on May 14, 2026.

CLARITY is market-structure legislation. It would assign spot-market oversight of most crypto assets to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission rather than the Securities and Exchange Commission, create a federal registration category for digital-commodity exchanges, brokers and dealers, and specify the conditions under which a network's native token stops being treated as a security. None of that exists in statute today. US digital-asset market structure is currently assembled from enforcement actions, no-action posture, state money-transmitter licensing, and the 1946 Howey test applied asset by asset.

Three specific disputes block the bill rather than scheduling drift, and each one protects a different institutional constituency: officials and candidates with crypto holdings, state and local prosecutors, and exchanges earning fees on stablecoin balances. Any text that resolves one of the three tends to cost votes on another. That is a durable obstruction because the groups involved are not trading against each other.

The more consequential effect of the delay is that the questions CLARITY was drafted to answer keep getting answered anyway, by agency product decisions and by litigation, in forums where the resolution attaches to a single product or a single defendant rather than to the market as a whole.

Two limits on what follows. Our sourcing is a July 2026 news account of the Senate stall and a law-firm legislative tracker; we do not have the operative bill text for the maturity test or for Section 604, and we flag where that matters. The House passage margin is reported as 294-134 in one account and 294-130 in another, and we have not reconciled the two against the official roll call. Any statement about final provisions or passage timing should be read as provisional.

## What the jurisdictional split moves

*[Figure: img1]*

CLARITY's central operation is to take spot trading in a defined class of assets out of the SEC's orbit and place it under the CFTC, while leaving the SEC with authority over assets that remain investment contracts. The tracker describes CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over digital-commodity spot markets alongside a registration regime for digital-commodity exchanges, brokers and dealers under CFTC oversight. That change alters structure rather than relabeling agencies, because the CFTC has never had a general spot-market registration framework for anything. Its authority historically runs to derivatives, with spot-market reach limited largely to fraud and manipulation after the fact.

A registration category is where most of the practical consequence sits. Today a US venue trading tokens assembles compliance from state money-transmitter licenses, a New York BitLicense where applicable, bank-secrecy obligations, and whatever accommodation it has reached with the SEC about which listings it will carry. A federal digital-commodity exchange registration replaces part of that patchwork with one supervised status, with the usual accompaniments: capital requirements, segregation of customer property, recordkeeping, reporting, and examination. Venues that already carry most of those obligations gain legal certainty on listings. Venues that carry few of them face a step change in cost.

The conforming amendments deserve more attention than they usually get. The tracker notes that CLARITY would extend CFTC commodity-pool regulation to digital-commodity spot-market activity. Commodity-pool rules were written for vehicles that take investor money and trade futures, with registration obligations for the operator and for anyone advising the pool. Applied to spot digital commodities, the same language can reach entities that do not think of themselves as funds. Digital asset treasury companies, which raise capital and hold tokens on balance sheet, are the most obvious candidates, along with the operators and advisors who manage those holdings. Whether that sweep is intended or incidental is not clear from available summaries, and it is the kind of provision that gets discovered after enactment rather than during markup.

What the sourcing does not describe is the transition mechanics. An asset that is an investment contract today and a digital commodity tomorrow has to move from one supervisory regime to another, with consequences for who may list it, what disclosures accompany it, and whether prior sales remain exposed to rescission claims. A statute that defines two categories without specifying the crossing procedure leaves the crossing to be litigated, which brings us to the provision the entire architecture rests on.

## The maturity test is load-bearing and we cannot read it

*[Figure: img2]*

The "mature blockchain" concept is the hinge that converts a token from the SEC's column to the CFTC's, and we do not have its statutory criteria. Our sources characterize it secondhand: a threshold at which a network is sufficiently decentralized that its native token sheds securities treatment. No committee report or bill text in our possession states the operative variables, the burden of proof, or the adjudicator. The analysis here addresses the problem the drafters faced rather than reading an unavailable statutory text.

Any workable maturity test has to fix three separate things, and they fail in different ways.

The first is the observable set. Decentralization in practice is a claim about control, and control shows up in at least four places: who can push a protocol upgrade, how stake or hash power is distributed across operators, what share of supply sits with the issuer and affiliated entities, and whether the network depends on a particular team to keep functioning. Each is measurable and each is gameable. Stake concentration can be diffused across nominally separate validators under common funding. Upgrade authority can be wrapped in a multisig whose signers are affiliated in substance but not on paper. Supply held by a foundation incorporated offshore is still supply held by someone with an interest in the token's price. A test written in counts and percentages invites structuring to the counts. A test written in substance reproduces the facts-and-circumstances inquiry that Howey already supplies, with new vocabulary and no accumulated case law.

The second is procedure. Three designs are available and they distribute risk very differently. An issuer self-certification with an agency objection window puts the burden on the regulator to act within a deadline, which favors issuers and creates a steady stream of certifications the agency may lack capacity to review. An affirmative agency determination puts the burden on the issuer and creates a queue, with the queue length becoming the real policy. Leaving it to courts means the question is only resolved when someone is sued, which is the status quo with extra steps. Our sourcing does not say which design CLARITY adopts, and the choice matters more to outcomes than the substantive criteria do.

The third is the consequence of error. Howey is assessed at the moment of sale, so a mistake crystallizes into liability for a transaction that already happened. A maturity test creates an ongoing status that can in principle flip. If a network that certified as mature later reconcentrates, does the token revert to securities treatment prospectively, or does the original certification become a registration violation with retroactive exposure? Exchanges listing the asset need an answer before they list, not after. A statute that is silent on reversion hands the question to the first enforcement action, and the venue that happens to be the defendant absorbs the cost of resolving it for everyone.

### Howey is litigated too, which is the strongest objection

A reasonable response to all of this is that persistent litigation does not make a standard unworkable. Howey has been contested continuously since 1946 and still functions as an administrable rule, because eight decades of appellate decisions have filled in the margins. Securities lawyers can advise on most fact patterns without going to court.

The objection is good but incomplete. A new statutory test resets the interpretive corpus to zero. The early years under any new standard are the expensive ones, and the parties who absorb that expense are the ones who move first. An established venue with counsel and reserves can afford to be an early test case; a new issuer generally cannot. So even a maturity test that eventually works well has a transition period whose cost falls unevenly, and the direction of that unevenness favors incumbents. That is a reason to want the criteria specified tightly in statute rather than left to development, and it is a reason the absence of public, detailed text this late in the process is itself informative.

## Three disputes, three constituencies

*[Figure: img3]*

The blocking disputes are not variations on a single disagreement about crypto. Each one threatens a distinct interest, which is why resolving them sequentially has not worked.

| Dispute | Procedural state | Objecting interest | Commercial or institutional stake |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ethics and insider-trading disclosure for officials | Van Hollen amendment failed 11-13 in Senate Banking; Senator Gillibrand treats enforceable disclosure as a precondition for support | Senate Democrats seeking conflict-of-interest rules | President Trump's disclosed crypto-related income reported at \~$1.4B (single source, unverified here) |
| Section 604 non-custodial developer carve-out | Included in House-passed text; contested through Senate consideration | National District Attorneys' Association and prosecutors generally | Charging theories under money-transmitter and Bank Secrecy Act statutes |
| Stablecoin yield | Senate Banking text of May 12, 2026 bars interest on idle balances while permitting activity-based rewards | Banking industry; interacts with the GENIUS Act interest prohibition | Coinbase USDC-linked rewards revenue reported at \~$1.35B annually (single source, unverified here) |

### Ethics disclosure is germane, not a rider

The ethics fight reads as unrelated to market structure until the maturity test is in view. CLARITY would give agencies discretion over categorization decisions that move asset prices directly. A determination that a given network has matured is a market event. Officials who hold the asset, or who hold interests in entities that do, are positioned ahead of that event. The disclosure demand is therefore internal to the bill's design rather than attached to it, which makes it harder to trade away. The Van Hollen amendment's 11-13 defeat in committee did not settle the question; it moved it to the floor, where Senator Gillibrand's precondition attaches directly to the votes the bill needs.

### Section 604 asks who can be charged when nobody holds funds

Money-transmitter liability historically turns on control of customer funds. A developer who publishes non-custodial software never takes possession of anything, which means most of the obligations attached to transmitter status are obligations that party cannot perform: it cannot freeze an account it does not hold, and it cannot onboard a counterparty it never contracts with. Section 604, as characterized in our sourcing, shields non-custodial developers and front-ends from money-transmitter and Bank Secrecy Act treatment on that basis.

Prosecutors object because the carve-out removes a charging theory that has been used against the authors of mixing and bridging software. Their position has an institutional logic that is not identical to the public interest, since agencies and offices generally prefer wider jurisdiction to narrower. But the objection is not merely self-serving. Narrowing transmitter liability to custodial actors leaves a genuine gap where the custodial actor is offshore and the software is the only US-connected element of a laundering route. Section 604 trades enforcement reach for developer certainty, and the people who bear the cost of each side of that trade are different people.

### Stablecoin yield is a deposit-competition fight wearing crypto clothes

A dollar token that pays its holder nothing competes poorly with a bank deposit that does. The GENIUS Act prohibits issuers from paying interest, which preserves that gap. Exchanges reconstructed the economics by paying holders for keeping balances on platform, funding the payment out of the reserve income the issuer earns. The Senate Banking text of May 12, 2026 attempts a line: no interest on idle balances, activity-based rewards permitted.

That line only binds if "activity" is defined narrowly. If holding a balance in an account that occasionally transacts counts as activity, the compromise relabels existing programs without changing them. If the definition requires transaction-linked payment with no accrual on resting balances, it cuts into a revenue line reported at roughly $1.35 billion annually at Coinbase. Our sourcing attributes that figure to a single news account and we have not verified it independently. The banking industry's interest here is deposit substitution, and it is the one dispute where the opposition has a direct financial exposure measurable in the same units as the beneficiary's.

## DeFi front-ends sit between two definitions

*[Figure: img4]*

CLARITY's registration triggers attach to intermediaries, and a DeFi front-end is an intermediary in some senses and not in others. An interface that constructs a transaction for a user to sign does not hold assets, which keeps it outside custodial definitions, but it does solicit orders and route them, which is the functional core of brokerage. Whether the bill's definition of a digital-commodity broker reaches that activity is not something we can determine from the available summaries, and it is probably the single most consequential drafting question for the sector.

The Senate Banking compromise reportedly added a DeFi trading-protocol framework and an insolvency safe harbor. Neither is described substantively in our sources. We note the gap rather than guess: a protocol framework could mean a conditional exemption keyed to non-custody, or it could mean a registration category with reduced obligations, and those produce opposite outcomes for the same projects.

The enforcement failure mode is independent of which definition wins. Registrable obligations attach to identifiable operators, and in a non-custodial stack the only identifiable operator is usually whoever runs a domain and a web server. Contracts deployed on a public chain have no operator to register. So front-end registration becomes a chokepoint applied to the most mobile component of the system, while the immobile component stays untouched. The predictable result is interface hosting moving outside US jurisdiction while the underlying contracts continue to process US-originated flow, which produces compliance cost without the supervisory visibility the cost was supposed to buy. Rather than arguing against regulating front-ends, this dynamic indicates that supervisory benefits must be specified before imposing obligations, which neither draft summary provides.

## Who gains from the stall

*[Figure: img5]*

The intuitive division, licensed US incumbents wanting passage and offshore venues wanting delay, holds only partially and breaks on the stablecoin question.

| Actor | Position under the current patchwork | Effect of CLARITY as described | Net incentive on timing |
|---|---|---|---|
| Licensed US exchanges | Operating with state licenses and negotiated listing posture; listing risk is the binding constraint | Federal registration plus listing certainty, but stablecoin-yield restrictions hit a live revenue line | Mixed; depends entirely on the yield definition |
| Offshore venues | Constrained by enforcement exposure and banking access rather than by the absence of a rulebook | A registration path they are unlikely to take; clearer perimeter for excluding them | Modest preference for delay |
| Banks | Deposit base competing with yield-bearing stablecoin products | GENIUS interest ban preserved and extended in substance | Prefer either passage with a tight definition, or delay |
| Non-custodial developers | Residual exposure to transmitter and BSA theories | Section 604 removes that exposure | Strong preference for passage |
| Prosecutors | Existing charging theories intact | Section 604 removes them | Strong preference for delay or amendment |
| Digital asset treasury companies | Unregistered holders of balance-sheet tokens | Possible commodity-pool registration for the entity and its advisors | Preference for delay, probably underexamined |

Two corrections to the standard story follow from the table. Offshore venues are already constrained by enforcement actions and by the difficulty of obtaining US banking relationships, and neither of those constraints depends on CLARITY's status. The marginal benefit they receive from the stall is real but smaller than the framing suggests, because the thing limiting their onshore reach is not the absence of a statute they would never register under.

The more interesting case is the incumbents. A licensed US exchange gains listing certainty from passage and loses a reported nine-figure revenue line to the yield provisions. Whether it prefers the bill depends on which number is larger, and the honest answer is that nobody outside the firms can compute it. Our sourcing does not document lobbying positions, spending, or stated preferences for any firm, so we decline to assign motive. What can be said structurally is that delay is cheap for any participant whose current revenue is legal under the patchwork, and that describes most of the large US venues. There is no urgency premium pushing them to accept unfavorable text.

The counterargument worth taking seriously is that the stall reflects genuine disagreement rather than capture. Enforceable ethics disclosure, law-enforcement access to non-custodial software, and deposit competition are all substantive questions on which reasonable legislators differ. Attributing the delay entirely to interested parties would be a cleaner story than the evidence supports.

## The vacuum gets filled by whoever is deciding something today

Every month without a statute, the questions CLARITY would settle get settled piecemeal by agency product decisions and by litigation. A derivatives exchange seeking to list a novel contract structure gets an answer from the CFTC about whether the structure is permissible; a venue defending an event-contract offering gets an answer from a court about where jurisdiction lies. Each answer is narrow in form and broad in effect, because the next participant designs to the precedent rather than to the statute that does not exist.

We flag explicitly that our sourcing does not document the specific perpetual-futures and prediction-market proceedings referenced in commentary around the bill, and we are not asserting facts about them. The structural point stands independently. Decisions made in the vacuum accumulate into operating practice, and operating practice is sticky. Firms build products, custody arrangements, and compliance functions around the answers they receive. Legislation arriving after that buildout does not write on a blank page; it has to displace capital already committed to the agency-level settlement. The longer the delay, the smaller the practical delta between CLARITY and the regime it would replace, and the more likely that the bill's eventual function is to ratify arrangements rather than direct them.

That dynamic also changes the lobbying calculus in a way that reinforces the stall. A participant that has received a favorable agency answer has less reason to accept statutory text that might reopen it. Delay converts provisional wins into entrenched ones.

## The procedural endgame and what would signal movement

Four veto points remain between the current position and enactment: reconciliation between the Senate Banking text and the Agriculture Committee's Digital Commodity Intermediaries Act, a 60-vote floor vote, reconciliation with the House-passed version, and a presidential signature. Each reconciliation step can reopen any of the three blocking disputes, because the committees did not resolve them identically. Analysts at Stifel and Beacon Policy Advisors characterized the weeks before the August 2026 recess as the last realistic window for 2026, with the path afterward likely to deteriorate materially or close for the year.

A cloture vote was reportedly scheduled for September 15, 2026. That date comes from a single tracker and we have not cross-checked it against the Senate calendar. Our available sourcing ends before any outcome is documented, and nothing in it shows the bill enacted. Readers should treat the bill's status after mid-2026 as unresolved in this analysis rather than as resolved against passage.

If CLARITY lapses with the Congress, the committee votes do not survive. The negotiated text can be reintroduced, and in practice much of it would be, but the 15-9 Banking margin and the House's 294-vote majority would have to be rebuilt against a changed membership. That resets the bargaining position of every group currently holding out, which is a reason for those groups to prefer lapse over compromise if they expect the next Congress to be friendlier.

Three observable conditions would indicate the deadlock is breaking rather than persisting. First, whether a manager's amendment appears carrying enforceable ethics-disclosure language, since that is the dispute with a named precondition attached to specific votes. Second, whether the maturity test emerges with objective criteria and a specified adjudication procedure, or with a substance-based standard left to agency development, because the second version mostly relocates the current ambiguity. Third, whether Section 604 survives in recognizable form after prosecutors' objections are addressed, since a carve-out narrowed to the point of inapplicability removes the bill's principal deliverable for non-custodial developers while keeping the political cost of having included it.
